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ABSTRACT
The Siege of Petersburg, fought from June 1864 until April 1865,
led to the eventual surrender of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia
and the end of the American Civil War. Just as important, however, is its
role as a case study for soldierly motivation during the war. Historians of
this time period often emphasize the high rate of desertion from the
Confederate Army at Petersburg and how it affected the war’s outcome.
While desertion played a decisive role at Petersburg, the soldiers who
decided against desertion tell a story that is just as important. This paper
attempts to explain why roughly 30,000 of Lee’s soldiers in the trenches at
Petersburg chose to continue fighting during a time when thousands of
other Confederates risked desertion instead.
What motivated these soldiers to stay? To answer this question,
this paper primarily uses letters sent between Confederate soldiers
defending Petersburg and their loved ones in states around the
Confederacy. Like all armies, the Army of Northern Virginia at Petersburg
featured a diverse group of individuals, each with different backgrounds
and life stories. Yet, the sources all demonstrate certain commonalities
that have allowed for important conclusions about the army as a whole.
For example, nearly all of the soldiers showed the most concern about the
fate of their family, property, and home communities, rather than their
actual safety and well-being.
To the Confederate soldier, honor was everything, and their
interpretation stemmed from their ability to provide for loved ones while
defending the well-being of the local community from which they came.
Men faced with the decision to desert or to fight on looked most of all to
preserve honor. Those who deserted often did so to return home.
Likewise, the letters from the soldiers who chose to stay and fight often
show that they did so in order to defend the well-being of their family and
property against both real and perceived threats at the end of the war.
They made the difficult decision to stay and fight during the last days of
the war for honor’s sake.
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The crisis of our fate is rapidly approaching, and men’s minds are harassed with
doubts, fears, and perplexity. The weak are for submission and those who have
more fortitude are affected by the fears of the timid. A few men remain strong
and if they have them conceal their fears. Are the names of the illustrious dead
to go down in history as traitors, instead of patriots?
-Confederate General Josiah Gorgas, diary entry from Richmond, March 6, 18651
A few weeks before the end of the American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln
held a meeting with Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, and Admiral
David Porter on board the River Queen docked at City Point, Virginia.
Discussing plans for peace, Lincoln expressed the tragic nature not only of the
end of the Civil War but of all wars, when he asked: “Must more blood be shed?”
Sherman’s answer was expectedly pessimistic when he characterized Robert E.
Lee as a “real general” who “would not await the inevitable conclusion but would
make one more desperate effort” to avoid having to surrender.2 While this
prediction proved true, it was not only Lee who continued to fight, but thousands
of others in his army - men who refused to give up when a decisive military
victory was impossible. At Appomattox Courthouse, only hours before Robert E.
Lee eventually surrendered, “more blood was shed” during vicious fighting that
cost the country roughly five hundred more fatalities, many of them occurring
only moments before peace was restored.3
Each of the men present for the fighting at Appomattox Courthouse tells
an important story about the war. Those who lost their lives that morning mark

1 Josiah Gorgas, The Civil War Diary of General Josiah Gorgas, ed. Frank E. Vandiver
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1947), 174-175.
Bruce Catton, The Centennial History of the Civil War, Volume III: Never Call Retreat (Garden
City: Doubleday, 1965), 440.
3 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army: From Victory to Collapse (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2008), 463.
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the unaffordable cost of the war’s final stages, when each minute threatened
further violence in a country longing for peace. In Why Confederates Fought,
Aaron Sheehan-Dean writes that “war, perhaps more than any other human
activity, invites explanations that ignore individuals.”4 His observation is an
important one that calls to attention the countless decisions and actions made by
common citizens forced to exist during times of war. At a minimum, for a war to
occur there must be individual combatants who are motivated to kill. Likewise,
for a war to end, individuals must somehow be motivated to stop killing. During
the final months of the Civil War in Virginia, thousands of Confederate soldiers in
the Army of Northern Virginia had to decide whether to desert the trenches or to
continue fighting Grant’s army. Many of these soldiers, for various reasons,
chose to stay. In fact, there were roughly 28,000 Confederate soldiers present
for the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse, and this number does not include
those who were either captured by Union forces, died, or were otherwise
incapable of marching with the army during its escape from Petersburg.5 While
other Confederate armies remained in the field after Lee’s surrender, these
soldiers were the last hope for Southerners who still dreamed of independence.
What forces motivated these individuals to stay in the trenches when thousands
of others chose to desert instead?

4 Aaron Sheehan-Dean, Why Confederates Fought: Family and Nation in Civil War Virginia
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2007), 8.
Jay Winik, April 1865: The Month that Saved America (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 197.
Other statistics for the occasion include 26,765 prisoners in David J. Eicher’s The Longest Night:
A Military History of the Civil War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 821 and 27, 647
prisoners in Chris Calkins’s The Appomattox Campaign, March 29-April 9, 1865 (Conshohocken:
Combined Books, 1997), 187-192.
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Motives are always difficult to ascertain, especially in a situation as chaotic
as war. Further complicating matters is the fact that no soldier acted in a
vacuum. Instead, each man had to decide to either stay or desert over time,
based upon imperfect information, and in a world full of onlookers who included
friends, family members, fellow soldiers, and commanding officers. We may
never fully understand why individual Confederate soldiers at Petersburg acted
as they did. Efforts to do so, however, allow for a better understanding of the
end of the Civil War in Virginia; they help to explain both why there was a
desperate retreat from Petersburg, and why General Lee’s Army of Northern
Virginia did not resort to guerrilla warfare as Union leaders greatly feared at the
time.
Bruce Catton described the orderly outcome of Lee’s final retreat as an
“unbelievable way to end a civil war, which by all tradition is the worst kind of war
there is.”6 Such a belief is certainly common among historians. That the soldiers
who overcame immense hardship to continue fighting - when desertion was a
serious albeit dangerous option - peacefully returned home after their surrender
at Appomattox Courthouse is a testament to the leaders of both armies and their
terms for peace. The chain of events ending at Appomattox Courthouse,
however, also highlights the feelings of uneasiness and mistrust that were
common among Confederate soldiers concerning the potential consequences of
a Union victory. In 1865, Abraham Lincoln described the troops who continued
to resist as “deluded,” recognizing the fatal misunderstanding between
Confederates who were still suspicious of the Union army’s intentions and the
6 Catton, Never Call Retreat, 456.
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Federal leaders who continued to push for reunion and emancipation as their
conditions for peace.7
A significant portion of these soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia at
the end of the war viewed the continuation of military duty as the most honorable
option available to them. Historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown defines an antebellum,
southern version of honor as “essentially the cluster of ethical rules, most readily
found in societies of small communities, by which judgments of behavior are
ratified by community consensus.”8 The decisions to stay or leave the trenches
included this definition of honor and caused Confederate soldiers to be most
concerned about how best to secure the rights, welfare, and respect of their
families and the local communities they came from. The soldiers who stayed
were as tired of war as the rest of the country and made their decisions
reluctantly, but they often concluded that duty in Lee’s army remained the most
honorable choice.
By the beginning of 1865, these soldiers found themselves caught
between a cherished past and a rapidly changing present that included the
federal government’s embrace of the elimination of slavery as a war aim and
devastating invasions by Union armies throughout the Confederacy. Fears
concerning the future and the war’s eventual effects upon southern homes and
communities added to the uncertainty of combat itself. In such an existence, it is
not surprising that many rumors about the war spread rapidly in Petersburg’s
trenches. Southern honor, according to Wyatt-Brown, initially developed to give
7 David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 574.
8 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (Oxford: Oxford
University, 1982), xv.
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meaning to lives and “provided a means to restrict human choices, to point a way
out of chaos.”9 At Petersburg, however, Lee and his soldiers could not escape
the chaos, and their concerns about honor further complicated their situation.
Nevertheless, thousands of these soldiers fought on to defend themselves, their
families and their beliefs by placing their faith in General Lee, the army, and - on
the most practical level - a struggle to defend the important railroad junction at
Petersburg against a much larger Union force.

9 Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor, 114.
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1. “Chained Down”
When the Civil war entered its fifth, and what would turn out to be its final
year, the nature of the conflict had escalated into something noticeably different
than in earlier stages of the fighting. Whether or not it had become a “total war”
or a “modern war” is debatable, but it had reached a new level of ferocity that
served to bring the Confederate experiment to the brink of failure. In Virginia, the
armies of Lee and Grant fought the bloodiest campaign of the war. At earlier
points, combat had been just as lethal as it became on the road to Petersburg,
but it had never been as protracted. In his memoirs, Ulysses S. Grant said that
the campaign had encompassed the most “desperate fighting as the world has
ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, or a single
season. The losses inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe/’10
Grant’s campaign would, along with other offensives throughout the South, spur
the collapse of the Confederacy and bring an end to the war. The battles leading
up to the Siege of Petersburg cost Lee roughly 33,000 casualties. Further
casualties at Petersburg were irreplaceable for a Confederate army that had lost
the ability to recruit new soldiers.11 The Confederacy not only began the war with
a smaller population than Union states, but many of the Southerners affected by
war also lost enthusiasm for the Confederate cause during the years leading up
to the clash at Petersburg.
Furthermore, the effects of the Siege of Petersburg on the Army of
Northern Virginia were paralyzing. The most obvious result was in the attrition of
10 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs and Letters (New York: LOA, 1990), 512.
11 John Keegan, The American Civil War: A Military History (New York: Vintage Books, 2009),
252.
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its size and strength. Many months of heavy casualties and the effects of
disease and sickness left the army with too few men to defend a rapidly
lengthening line of defense. Confederate General Cadmus M. Wilcox recorded
that his men sometimes stood thirty paces apart in order to defend their
section.12 The historian Douglas Southall Freeman characterizes the Army of
Northern Virginia’s predicament by the summer of 1864 as being “chained down
and unable to employ the offensive strategy that had won it many battles.”13
Along with external pressures that included Union military successes in
other regions and Abraham Lincoln’s re-election in 1864, the time Confederate
soldiers spent in the trenches defending Petersburg caused high rates of
desertion. More so than any other battle, the Siege of Petersburg prompted the
choice between desertion and persistence. Out of an army that entered the
trenches at Petersburg with roughly 50,000 men, one well-researched estimate
claims that between 7,000 and 8,000 Confederate soldiers deserted during the
final three months of the siege alone.14 One brigade of South Carolinians,
initially numbering around 1,000 men at the beginning of August, 1864, lost 104
soldiers to desertion during the war’s final eight months.15
Desertion from the army had always been a problem for the Confederacy,
but the hard fighting of 1864 served to accentuate its effects on the shrinking
12 A. Wilson Greene, Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion: The Final Battles of the Petersburg
Campaign (Mason City, Savas, 2000), 282.
13 Douglass Southall Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, vol. 3 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001),
541.
14 John Horn, The Petersburg Campaign: June 1 8 6 4 - April 1865 (Cambridge: Da Kapo, 1993),
217.
15 J.F.J. Caldwell, The History of a Brigade of South Carolinians: First Known as “Gregg’s ” and
Subsequently as “McGowan’s Brigade” (Dayton: Morningside, 1992), 221, 256. Initially published
in 1866 in Philadelphia, Caldwell wrote the majority of this unit history at Petersburg at the
insistence of his commander, Brigadier General Samuel McGowan.
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army. Foreshadowing the future, Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis before the
renewal of fighting in 1864 that “desertion and absence without leave are nearly
the only offenses ever tried by our courts. They appear to be the only vices in
the army.”16 During the Petersburg Campaign, desertion also became the
foremost signal of a deteriorating Confederacy. While there were many reasons
that thousands of soldiers deserted from Petersburg, the failing war effort was at
the root of this increase. Historian James McPherson broadly concludes that
“the rising southern desertion rate was primarily a result of defeat, not a cause.”17
First of all, the siege directly affected the physical condition of the soldiers,
serving to test the limits of human agony and endurance. One particular
hardship concerned the clothing and shelter of the army during its final winter.
The military historian J. Tracy Power found that “the lack of adequate clothing,
shoes, and blankets was often cited as a major reason for the increased number
of desertions as winter set in and some soldiers went over to the enemy to
acquire them.” Other Confederates, unwilling to desert, on one occasion
attacked a group of Union pickets for no other reason than to steal their
“overcoats, shoes, and blankets.”18 One South Carolinian described the pain
involved when he wrote that “shoes were scarce. More than once a soldier left a
bloody track on the frozen picket line.”19 Fuel shortages only made the situation
worse. According to Joseph Glatthaar, hospitals in Richmond no longer had

16 Glatthaar, General L ee’s Army, 408.
17 James McPherson, “American Victory, American Defeat,” Why the Confederacy Lost, ed.
Gabor S. Boritt (New York: Oxford University, 1992), 29.
18 J. Tracy Power, L ee’s Miserables: Life in the Army of Northern Virginia from the Wilderness to
Appomattox (Chapel Hill: UNC, 1998), 223.
19 Caldwell, The History of a Brigade of South Carolinians, 255.

enough wood or coal to keep their buildings warm.20 The lack of proper clothing
and materials during the Petersburg winter, along with a seemingly endless
struggle against the Army of the Potomac, caused many Confederates to desert,
and these hardships became an obstacle that many others either overcame or
died trying.
Hunger was an equally significant problem for the soldiers. While the
siege did not completely isolate Richmond from the outside world, it applied
enough pressure to slowly reduce the soldiers’ rations. Occasionally the men
would write positively about what they had to eat, as when Fred A. Brode, a
Louisiana soldier, wrote to his sister enthusiastically about his Christmas Day
dinner in 1864.21 When rations were adequate, as they were that day, morale
was naturally higher. Dinners such as the Christmas feast, however, quickly
became the exception. By the beginning of 1865, troops rarely received more
than some bread or cornmeal for their rations. Lieutenant J.F.J. Caldwell
recorded in his unit’s history that “it was amusing, as well as sad, to see the
delight of the troops over a drop of comfort. All this time the enemy drank coffee,
ate fat, fresh beef, and good bread.”22 Nutritional deficiencies caused a scurvy
epidemic as well as a high number of pneumonia cases.23 Nathaniel Venable
Watkins of the 14th Virginia Infantry wrote in January 1865 to his wife that the
rations had “considerably reduced. I fear the number of desertions will

20 Glatthaar, General L ee’s Army, 448.
21 CpI. Fred A. Brode to his sister Josephine Trenchard, 27 December 1864, Brode Papers,
Museum of the Confederacy Archives (MOC), Richmond, VA.
22 Caldwell, The History of a Brigade of South Carolinians, 255.
23 Glatthaar, General L ee’s Army, 446.
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increase.”24 J. Tracy Power writes of the army’s response to its soldiers’
complaints that “commissary officers often responded to such reports with
various explanations that were technically correct but displayed little sympathy
for the plight of the soldiers in the ranks.”25 While these hardships helped to
cause widespread desertion and the eventual Confederate defeat, the soldiers
who stayed somehow developed the ability to overcome them in order to base
their decisions upon matters other than day-to-day survival and comfort.
The best example of this characteristic is the way soldiers responded to
news about Union victories across other regions in the South as well as the war’s
political implications. Because the Confederate soldiers at Petersburg
maintained the ability to think in strategic and political terms, incoming news
rather than the daily misery of trench life caused the most fluctuation between
hope and despair among soldiers manning the front lines. They understood that
the lack of proper food and clothing was a national phenomenon and was largely
a consequence of the naval blockades as well as the campaigns of Sherman and
Union General Philip Sheridan in other theaters of the war. News updates on
these events served to squeeze hope out of the Confederate people as well as
the men in Lee’s army.
Another example involves the 1864 Union presidential election. James
McPherson writes that the “election was a referendum on the war and
emancipation. No one could be entirely sure what the consequences of a

24 Capt. Nathaniel V. Watkins to his wife, 19 January 1865, Watkins Papers, Swem Library
Special Collections (SWEM), College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA.
25 Power, Lee’s Miserables, 224.
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Democratic victory would be.”26 To the soldiers in the Confederate trenches
surrounding Petersburg, Lincoln’s re-election would protract an already lengthy
war whereas his defeat might help the Confederate cause. In an episode that
served as a microcosm for the war as a political conflict, Confederate and Union
pickets carrying on a peaceful conversation outside Petersburg once broke into a
fight after one of the Southerners called Lincoln a “damned abolitionist.”27 The
strength of Democratic Presidential candidate George McClellan was promising
enough to prevent many Confederates from deserting throughout the fall, and it
made politics the central focus of those who endured the miseries of trench life
on a daily basis.
In this hopeful climate leading up to the Presidential election of 1864
rumors circulated through the Army of Northern Virginia that peace might come
soon. From the trenches on July 26, 1864, Fred A. Brode wrote home to his
sister, Josephine Trenchard, that he hoped “this fall will decide the fate of this
war, and give peace once more. I should not be surprised if the next Presidential
Campaign will settle this thing. I do not believe that the people in the North will
stand it much [longer]. They are getting tired of the war I think.”28 Shortly after
the Democratic national convention in 1864, Nathaniel Watkins wrote home
excitedly curious about what his wife thought of McClellan while explaining his
own approval of the nomination.29 Much to many of the Confederate soldiers’
disappointment, Lincoln was re-elected on November 8, 1864. Afterwards, some
26 James McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: the Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1997), 492.
27 Bruce Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox (New York: Random House, 1988), 562.
28 Fred A. Brode to his sister Josephine Trenchard, 26 July 1864, MOC.
29 Nathaniel V. Watkins to his wife, September 10, 1864, SWEM.
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soldiers began to doubt that there could ever be peace, as when Luther Swank of
Virginia wrote home that “Old Abe is elected again and all hopes of an honorable
peace are yet far in the distance.”30 Others somehow managed to twist the news
optimistically, as when one Virginian believed that Lincoln’s “election will cause a
revolution in the North West, while McClellan, if elected, will be able to rally more
men to the army.”31 Power explains that such optimism remained among
Confederate soldiers, “perhaps as much to reassure themselves as to convince
their families and friends.”32
The most important result of Lincoln’s re-election in 1864 was the
affirmation that the war would continue until the Union was restored. From the
Confederate trenches, the results of the November elections triggered mostly
pessimism. Captain Elmore Hall, for example, wrote home to his father that “We
are in for four years more - Well, I can stand it, and on my own account don’t
dread it at all, but I do feel for the many in our country who will suffer from it.”33
While Hall believed he would persevere, many in the army did not. The news of
Lincoln’s re-election along with the coming of cold weather sent waves of
surrendering Confederates to Union pickets. One Confederate soldier informed
another that he would be deserting, because “A. Lincoln is elected for four more
years” and that “he could not stand the idea of hardship of four more long years
of war.”34

30 Luther L. Swank to his sister Kate, 19 November 1864, Library of Virginia Archives (LOV),
Richmond, VA.
31 Aaron Sheehan-Dean, Why Confederates Fought, 175.
32 Power, Lee’s Miserables, 218-219.
33 Ibid., 218.
34 Ibid., 219.

12

One reason that desertion became especially problematic for the
Confederate government at Petersburg was the mindset of the individual soldier.
Joseph Glatthaar believes that “Confederates came from a society that
encouraged independence and independent-mindedness.” Because of this
characteristic, Lee always had a difficult time “breaking soldiers of the practices
of leaving the line with wounded comrades, just drifting away from combat
because they did not feel like fighting, or plundering in the midst of battle.”35 In
the final months at Petersburg, particularly after the re-election of Abraham
Lincoln, soldiers not only deserted more frequently, but an increasing number
simply went over to the Union army. That so many of them left for enemy lines at
this time also forced both armies to make important decisions regarding the
actions of these soldiers. These men did not leave directly for home, but instead
risked immediate surrender to enemy forces, in many cases to avoid being
arrested by other Confederates for desertion.
The most obvious cause of this phenomenon was the failure of the
Confederacy to provide for the army. By the end of the war, writes Bruce Catton,
“The Confederacy was visibly failing - in manpower, in rations, in equipment.”
One Federal officer reported that forty deserters came to his lines over a span of
forty-eight hours, noting that this statistic was about average. One of these
deserters was sixty years of age and immediately began cursing the
Confederacy in front of a group of Union soldiers. “When these men talked about
the Southern cause, it was said, they would remark that it was a rich man’s war

35 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 466
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and a poor man’s fight.” 36 To many Union observers, it was simply war
weariness and contempt for the Confederacy that drove these men to desert and
surrender. While these issues undoubtedly motivated Confederates to leave
their trenches, the growing trend was also a result of a Union strategy to
communicate their merciful plans for peace to the Confederates defending
Petersburg.
The men who voluntarily surrendered were a valuable asset to the Union
army in many ways. First of all they provided Federal officers with significant
intelligence regarding the size and morale of Lee’s army. Second, the Union
army promoted Confederates’ desertion as a weapon by directly appealing to
additional Confederate soldiers to desert and surrender. In August 1864, Grant
issued his Circular No. 31, “which stated that rebel deserters could not be
enrolled, drafted, used as substitutes, or otherwise recruited into the United
States Army.” Going even further, he also offered the deserters (along with
Southern civilians) high payments for weapons, ammunition, animals, and others
supplies. Last, and most important, he agreed to transport new defectors back to
their homes if the territory was under Union control. Added to this promise were
generous job offers on the railroads or in telegraph offices behind the front
lines.37
Before these offers, Grant had also stopped the exchange of prisoners in
order to further wound the Confederacy’s supply of soldiers. In contrast to
capture, voluntary surrender offered what a P.O.W. camp could not: peace, food,
36 Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox, 652-653.
37 Mark A. Weitz, A Higher Duty: Desertion among Georgia Troops during the Civil War (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska, 2000), 57.
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money, and the possibility of going home permanently to friends and family. To
communicate his message to Confederate soldiers, Grant took advantage of the
interactions formed between opposing men on picket duty, which tended to be
relatively peaceful throughout the war. How well the message passed through
Confederate trenches is difficult to determine, but Grant’s merciful offers fell in
line with Federal peace plans and seem to have been one of the few avenues
that Lincoln’s government used to communicate directly to the people Lincoln
himself described as “deluded.” The soldiers who actually made it to Union lines
during this time validated a strategy that helped end the war with less bloodshed
than might otherwise have ensued. According to historian Mark A. Weitz, writing
specifically about Georgian deserters, these men helped to “seed occupied areas
in the South with reconstructed soldiers, who might make the transition of its
civilian population easier once the war [ended].”38
Part of Grant’s order that would have been most appealing to the
Confederates was his promise to send deserters home after taking an oath of
loyalty to the Union. The ability to return home to take care of families was the
highest and most honorable priority for many men, especially as families and
farms threatened to fall apart in the final year of the war. For example, Annie
Evans, anticipating the coming of Sherman’s army, wrote to her husband at
Petersburg: “I can hardly tell you my anxieties and fears for a few days past. I
feel sometimes almost ready to faint by the way - so much excitement, so many
thousand rumors, and so much turmoil every way.”39 Another wife wrote to her

38 Weitz, A Higher Duty, 58.
39 Glatthaar, General L ee’s Army, 449.
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husband simply: “I want you to come home as soon as you can after you get this
letter.”40 Letters from wives and other family members had a profound influence
on soldiers, but the eventual absence of letters caused by Union occupation
made the pull of home even stronger. Sherman’s March in particular forced
many Confederates out of the trenches to search for answers about their
families.
Internal pressures faced by soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia mainly lack of food, supplies, and equipment - laid the foundation for a high rate
of desertion at Petersburg. Concerns about friends and families back home,
however, had a stronger influence over the soldiers who eventually deserted.
Also, external events such as Sherman’s March often became the tipping point
for many deserters. While there were soldiers of every type who deserted, those
who earned less money, who did not own slaves, who were fighting closer to
home, and who had children deserted at a slightly higher rate.41 The best
conclusion about both deserters and non-deserters, though, comes from Ella
Lonn’s 1928 study of Civil War desertion: “All Southern soldiers had a strong
consciousness of themselves as free moral agents; they were wholly
unaccustomed to acting on any other than their own motion.”42
By 1865, however, Confederate soldiers choosing to desert from the Army
of Northern Virginia would find it more difficult to act on “their own motion.” Some
even concluded that desertion was too much of a risk and decided to stay for this

40 Reid Mitchell, “The Perseverance of Soldiers,” Why the Confederacy Lost, ed. GaborS. Boritt
(New York: Oxford University, 1992), 126.
Ibid., 109-110.
42 Ella Lonn, Desertion during the Civil War (Gloucester: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), 15.
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reason alone. In the past, men who were caught deserting could expect a death
sentence, but were more often sentenced to hard labor or a forfeiture of pay. In
the spring of 1864, Lee began to see that changes were going to be necessary
when he wrote to Jefferson Davis about deserters, “It is certain that a relaxation
of the sternness of discipline as a mere act of indulgence, unsupported by good
reasons, is followed by an increase in the number of offenders.”43 From the
perspective of the Confederate leadership, the war had always been about
getting soldiers to fight. Consequently, during the Siege of Petersburg, the minds
of the individual Confederate soldiers became the primary battleground. Lee had
to motivate his soldiers to continue to kill the enemy, while Grant was doing his
best to convince them of the merits of surrender.
Here, the conflict between military and domestic needs was unavoidable.
By the final year of the war, more families were suffering than ever before, yet
the Confederate armies were still in need of every man who could fight. In the
past, state governments had focused much of their recruiting efforts on assuring
soldiers that their families would be taken care of. As late as April 1864, at least
one Alabama county continued to recruit volunteers by raising funds for families
left at home.44 In the ideal Confederate world, armies would have had enough
soldiers to defend farms and plantations while those plantations sustained the

43 Robert E. Lee to Jefferson Davis, 13 April 1864, in ed. Douglas Southall Freeman, L ee’s
Dispatches: Unpublished Letters of General Robert E. Lee, C.S.A., to Jefferson Davis and the
War Department of the Confederate States of America, 1862-1865 (Baton Rouge: Lousiana State
University, 1994), 156.
44 Bessie Martin, Desertion of Alabama Troops From the Confederate Army: A Study in
Sectionalism (New York: AMS Press, 1966), 168. Named the Central Aid Society of Talladega,
the organization promised to donate $20,000 annually to families whose men left for war. During
the final year of the war, they no longer had the ability to support at least 3,979 individuals then in
need and had to rely on taxation rather than voluntary contributions.
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welfare of local families. Instead, families and plantations alike suffered from the
pressures of war. Volunteers continued to join and many soldiers continued to
fight, but it had also become obvious that neither local organizations nor the
government had the ability to support the families of soldiers.
A similar strategy meant to benefit the families at home was the furlough
system. Before Petersburg, Lee often granted furloughs to soldiers as a way to
raise the morale of his troops, especially veterans and those dealing with family
crises at home. Many historians have concluded that the Union army’s promise
of a thirty-day furlough was reward enough to impel a majority of Union veterans
to re-enlist and “hazard three years more of hell.”45 But the Confederacy could
not afford to have soldiers go on furlough from the trenches of Petersburg. In
addition to creating immediate manpower shortages, the lucky few soldiers who
left Petersburg on furlough often remained home illegally for the remainder of the
conflict. In 1865, only one in every 100 soldiers received a furlough, and these
soldiers had to be from regions of the Confederacy not yet taken by Union armies
(the latter encompassing parts of South Carolina, North Carolina, Louisiana, and
Virginia). Lee did, however, offer furloughs to soldiers who could somehow
recruit new volunteers from home, though this was virtually impossible by 1865.40
Unable to send soldiers home or support the families of soldiers, the Confederate
government needed new methods to prevent desertion. Confederate leaders
such as Lee and General James Longstreet concluded that the threat of
punishment was their only choice.
45 Gerald Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War
(New York: The Free Press, 1987), 263.
Power, Lee’s Miserables, 301.
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One Confederate deserter, whether correct or not, put into words the
Confederacy’s greatest predicament after Union cavalry captured him in the
Shenandoah Valley: “Large numbers of Lee’s army are deserting daily;
sometimes as many as 200 a day. At least half would desert if they had the
opportunity.”47 This soldier’s belief that many in the army could not desert might
have had something to do with Lee’s attempts to change the way his army
functioned. During World War II, Soviet leadership coerced its troops to fight the
Germans by placing a rank of machine guns behind them during battle. Although
soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia rarely experienced such extreme
treatment, many of the changes were made with similar purposes in mind. Lee
and Longstreet obviously understood the importance of limiting every opportunity
that their men had to escape the military - especially while Grant was running a
successful campaign to incite desertion from the Confederate trenches. The
picket line was where the Confederate army decided to focus its efforts to stop
desertion, largely because Grant’s tactics were proving successful. Writing home
in the summer of 1864, Brode described the normal process of trading with
Yankee pickets: Confederates would give Union men tobacco while receiving
coffee in return. But on this day, he wrote, “even this has stopped, and I am very
glad of it, as it gives the men too much chance to desert. Any man going in front
of the line of pickets is to be shot.”48 How many of these deserters were shot at
Petersburg is unknown, but the new rule was especially noticeable to Union
soldiers in opposing trenches. Bruce Catton concludes that “heavy firing on the

47 Power, Lee’s Miserables, 236.
48 CpI. Fred A. Brode to his sister Josephine Trenchard, 27 December 1864, Brode Papers, MOC.
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picket lines was always taken to mean that the enemy was trying to keep
deserters away.”49
After Longstreet recovered from wounds that he received at the Battle of
the Wilderness and returned to duty, he advised and implemented further
changes to fight desertion. He first ordered that abatis (large, sharpened
obstacles) be placed in front of his own picket lines to block the interaction with
Union soldiers where possible. He also positioned his most disloyal units across
from Union colored regiments, because few Confederate soldiers were willing to
suffer the supposed dishonor of surrendering to them. In addition to these
measures, Longstreet warned his soldiers that “remedies of the most severe kind
are required to keep the army together this winter.”50
Lee also took more extreme measures to, as Glatthaar writes, “change the
culture of his army.”51 In his General Order No. 8, Lee warned that “The penalty
for advising or persuading a soldier to desert is death.”52 Later, he appointed
what were called “fire closers.” These men wore special badges and received
orders to prevent straggling during marches; they would stand behind their own
soldiers in the trenches “with loaded guns and fixed bayonets.”53 Like Soviet
soldiers during World War II, the Confederate soldiers, during what became the
final two months of the war, theoretically faced the threat of immediate death
from men within their own army if they attempted to desert.

49 Bruce Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox, 652.
50 Glatthaar, General L ee’s Army, 435.
51 Ibid., 455.
52 Power, L ee’s Miserables, 262.
53 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 455.
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The changes in the Army of Northern Virginia, however, were often
ineffective. Often, soldiers refused to fire on their comrades or “deliberately fired
away from them.” Moreover, a sympathetic understanding of desertion existed
among the men, as demonstrated by comments made by enlisted soldiers about
an Alabama Captain’s desertion: “Captain Reaves was not disloyal. He is like
many another man.”54 Virginian John J. Trainer made light of a desertion attempt
in which “some of our boys would holler over to them [the Union army] that here
is your peace commissioners.”55 Even so, as Glatthaar observes, “the mere fact
that the Confederacy had to post pickets in the rear of the army spoke
volumes.”56
A code of honor that prioritized the family and local communities initially
served to motivate men during times of chaos. At the end of the Civil War at
Petersburg, however, honor only caused confusion for Confederates faced with
the decision to leave the trenches for home. Just as men in the trenches often
forgave those who deserted, deserters also felt badly for those they left behind.
One group of North Carolinians left a note before parting that “explained their
reasons for leaving, asked their comrades to forgive them, and said they
intended ‘to take 60 days furlough’ and return, assuring that they meant ‘no
crime’ by their actions.”57 For many, there was no longer an honorable course of
action, only a difficult decision among equally dishonorable outcomes.

54 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 451.
55 John J. Trainer to his sister, February 10, 1865, Trainer Papers, LOV.
56 Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army, 451.
57 Power, L ee’s Miserable, 261-262.
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The term desertion carries with it connotations of cowardice and disloyalty.
Yet it is possible, especially given the unusually high rate of desertion over such
a short span of time at the end of the Civil War, that the majority of Confederate
soldiers came to respect the need for deserters to reach their families as an act
no less noble than fighting. Some men may have stayed simply because they
did not think they could make it home, or because they feared being shot by a
fellow Confederate while attempting to flee. After all this, though, the Army of
Northern Virginia still remained a product of its own people and produced an
environment in which desertion was difficult to prevent. As the Union army
gained the ability to threaten the safety of every family in the South, Confederate
soldiers often deserted without losing the respect of the men who decided to
stay.
Confederate soldiers in Lee’s army took pride in free will: they did not want
to be “chained down” by either the Union Army or their own leaders as they were
at Petersburg. When they felt that their service to the government or to the
military no longer offered an honorable means to defend friends and family at
home, many deserted. As one anonymous man complained to Georgia
Governor Joseph Brown: “Must myself and my wife have our hearts torn from us,
dripping with patriotic blood?”58 One deserter made clear his opinion regarding
honor when he wrote, “I love my country as dear as anyone, but am unwilling to
sacrifice domestic happiness to good public opinion. Anyone that would do it is
unworthy of either.”59 For many, however, the decision was more difficult. While

58 Weitz, A Higher Duty, 121.
59 Glatthaar, General L ee’s Army, 411.
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those who stayed and those who deserted acted differently in the end, their
motivations often revolved around the ability to maintain independence and
defend honor. Above all, both deserters and non-deserters were conscious, and
often critical, of the weaknesses and failures of a Confederate government that
could no longer support or defend its people from the chaos of war.
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2.

Honor before Peace

As the Confederate and Union armies settled in for a siege in front of
Petersburg during the final half of 1864, political events and elections came to
reflect the will of many Confederate people to carry on a faltering war effort. Just
as Lincoln’s re-election at the end of 1864 signaled a Union commitment to
victory, Confederate elections during that time reveal much about the resolve of
civilians and soldiers to continue resisting. The 1864 North Carolina
gubernatorial race between the incumbent Zebulon Vance and William Holden,
for example, turned into a contest exclusively focused on war and peace. Vance,
though a persistent critic of Jefferson Davis and the government in Richmond,
nevertheless promised a commitment to Confederate independence: “No
reconstruction or submission, but perpetual independence.” On the other hand,
Holden and his supporters ran on a peace platform, acknowledging that “if the
people of North Carolina are for perpetual conscription, impressments, and
seizures to keep up a perpetual, devastating and exhausting war, let them vote
for Governor Vance.”60
James McPherson characterizes this election as “the most serious internal
threat to the Confederacy” up to that time in the war and writes that Holden’s
plans might have led North Carolina back into the Union.61 Instead, the
population of North Carolina showed a determination to continue fighting the
Yankees and voted overwhelmingly for Zebulon Vance. Furthermore, of the
15,033 soldiers who voted in the election, 13,209 decided to support Vance - the
60 Glenn Tucker, Zeb Vance: Champion of Personal Freedom (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965),
360-361.
61 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York, Oxford, 2003), 698.
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candidate who “would fight the war to the finish” in order to secure an honorable
peace.62 These soldiers from North Carolina were tired of war, but a
considerable majority remained unwilling to give in to Union demands. For these
individuals and many other Confederate soldiers defending of Petersburg,
fighting the war remained the most honorable choice.
The men of the Army of Northern Virginia held diverse opinions about the
war. Yet there were common strains of thought that existed among those who
decided to stay. Many of them concluded for various reasons that military duty in
the Confederate army was the best way to defend their homes and families from
the increasingly aggressive tactics of the invading armies of the Union. In his
influential book about Civil War soldiers, For Cause and Comrades, James
McPherson admits that there were soldiers who became “negative, cynical, and
callous” as the war progressed, and that “without question there was a decline in
the romantic flag-waving rhetoric of the war’s first two years.” Yet McPherson
concludes that “this is not the whole story. Indeed it is not even the most
important part of the story.”63 Pointing out continued enthusiasm for the war until
the very end, historian Jason Phillips similarly recognizes that many soldiers
c

“saw and fought a war radically different from the one we imagine in retrospect.”
Calling these soldiers “diehard rebels,” Phillips believes not only that many
Confederates desired to fight it out until the end, but that they expressed a

62 Tucker, Zeb Vance, 360, 366.
63 James McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men fought in the Civil War (New York:
Oxford, 1997), 168.
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“resilient ethos” and a “culture of invincibility”64 Just as thousands of soldiers
chose to desert from Petersburg for the honorable defense of loved ones at
home, many others chose to stay with the Army of Northern Virginia for the same
reasons. Of these, many even believed that they could still win the war.
One important reason for misplaced Confederate confidence was General
Lee. As long as Robert E. Lee, called “Uncle Robert” or “Marse Robert” by his
soldiers, was in command, there would be Confederate soldiers willing to
overcome hardships and fight to the finish. His ability to keep an army of
thousands in the field during the final months of the war affected events as much
as any other factor. At Petersburg, Lee became representative of the many men
who did not desert him, and those same men shared a desire to emulate the
unwavering sense of duty apparent in their general. Most important, Lee became
a final but potent symbol of hope for soldiers and civilians alike who wanted to
believe that independence was still possible. Author Clifford Dowdey believes
that, during “the months of long agony while the Confederacy was disintegrating
around the Richmond-Petersburg stronghold, there were thousands of soldiers
with Lee who never believed they could be defeated with Uncle Robert.”65 One
Alabama soldier wrote home that “we are not a frade of the Yankees while we
have old General Lee to lead us in the fites.” Another relayed to his family that
“what Marse Robert says is gospel in this squad - the A.N.V.”66 At the beginning
of 1865, the Richmond Examiner reported: “We hear from all parts of the
64 Jason Phillips, Diehard Rebels: The Confederate Culture of Invincibility (Athens, University of
Georgia, 2007), 2-8.
65 Clifford Dowdey, Lee’s Last Campaign: The Story of Lee and his Men Against Grant - 1864
(Boston: Skyhorse, 1960).
Power, Lee’s Miserables, 298.
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Richmond lines that the appointment of General Lee to the command of all
armies of the Confederacy has been the cause of great reanimation in the
_

,

army.

»67

One soldier who stayed with General Lee until the end was Carlton
McCarthy, who later wrote a memoir about his experiences as a private in the
army. A vivid description about what the soldiers thought of their commanding
general arose from events shortly after the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse.
McCarthy recalled in 1882 that “not a man was heard to blame General Lee. On
the contrary, all expressed the greatest sympathy for him and declared their
willingness to submit at once, or fight to the last man, as he ordered.” During
both the siege and the escape along the Appomattox River, the soldiers
experienced numerous hardships. While soldiers continually blamed the
Confederate government and its leadership, few ever blamed Lee. In fact, as
McCarthy wrote, “At no period in the war was he held in higher veneration or
regarded with more sincere affection.”68 For many soldiers fearful about what the
future might bring, Lee’s presence made the Army of Northern Virginia and its
long network of defenses appear as the final bulwark of a society torn apart by
war. He not only avoided denunciation by his men, but became an example of
duty and honor to men faced with life-threatening decisions.
While Lee was one powerful source of Confederate hope, there were
other reasons why many soldiers maintained a positive outlook at Petersburg.
Whereas events during 1864 and 1865 caused many to desert, other soldiers
67 “The Spirit of the Army,” Richmond Examiner, Feb. 3, 1865.
68 Carlton McCarthy, Detailed Minutiae of Soldier Life in the Army of Northern Virginia (Richmond:
Carlton McCarthy and Company, 1882), 154.
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found the ability to cope by believing certain rumors that have proven untrue in
retrospect. Charles Baughman of Virginia, on October 4, 1864, wrote to his
father about a story concerning Sherman’s army in Atlanta, “We heard here last
night that [Joe] Wheeler had compelled Sherman to evacuate Atlanta and that he
[Sherman] was retreating to Chattanooga.”69 Such a rumor may have given gave
Baughman and others hope that Lee’s army could break out and force Grant’s
army to retreat in a similar manner while also calming fears among soldiers with
loved ones in Georgia and other parts of the Deep South.
Sherman never withdrew as Baughman had believed. Yet, as Sherman’s
army moved relatively unopposed through Georgia and into the Carolinas,
optimistic rumors never faded among Confederates. Instead, these rumors
continued to affect Confederate soldiers forced to decide whether to fight on. A
letter written from Nathaniel Venable Watkins to his wife in February predicted
that he thought Sherman would run into a “trap of some kind” that would finally
“destroy his army.”70 Less than two weeks before Lee evacuated Petersburg and
Richmond, Private Edward Armstrong of North Carolina wrote home to his cousin
that he had heard that Confederate General Joseph Johnston was about to “whip
Sherman,” that Johnston would “no doubt” receive reinforcements, and that
Sherman would never be able to march through their home state as easily as he
had through South Carolina.71 Sherman’s success proved to be an instrument of
psychological warfare that convinced many soldiers defending Petersburg to
desert, but it was not as effective against Lee’s army as one might assume.
69 Charles Baughman to his father, 4 October 1864, MOC.
70 Nathaniel V. Watkins to his wife, 23 February 1865, SWEM.
71 Edward Armstrong to his cousin, 22 March 1865, MOC.
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Those who stayed despite the overwhelming success of Sherman’s march did so
by investing hope in mostly false information. The high number of references to
Sherman’s army by Confederate soldiers at Petersburg depicts the environment
they lived in - one in which men sought but often could not obtain definitive
answers about the fate of families, land, and property back home.
Soldiers also expressed optimism because they did not want to believe
that their sacrifices had been for nothing. In March 1864, Richard Brooks wrote
to his mother responding to a rumor that the army would soon evacuate
Petersburg: “Now I cannot believe that General Lee will give up a place he has
spent so much time and labor on, and has rendered almost impregnable.”72
Having to admit defeat after nearly four years of bloodshed was difficult for many
of the men. Charles Baughman’s letter to his wife demonstrates the power of
individual investment and sacrifice, “We have no idea of submitting after having
underwent all the hardships and dangers of the last four years,” he wrote.73 Such
an expression was not uncommon from the soldiers who stayed, and this attitude
made defeat an unacceptable option. While men continued to fight at Petersburg
in the belief that the war would still be won, many also grasped every opportunity
to remain optimistic in order to avoid having to declare that their efforts had been
futile. In many cases, they also hoped to buoy the spirits of loved ones back
home who were beginning to lose hope.
Loyalty to Robert E. Lee as well as this desire for victory also helps
explain the strong support among troops at Petersburg for the planned

72 Richard Brooks to his “Ma,” 4 March 1865, Brooks family Papers, LOV.
73 Charles A. Baughman to his wife, 19 January 1865.
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recruitment of African-American soldiers into the Confederate army. When the
disastrous manpower shortage finally forced lawmakers to pass the measure on
March 13, 1865, some of Lee’s soldiers could not be convinced to fight alongside
former slaves, as when one North Carolinian wrote, “I hope they will not send
[African-American soldiers] to the Army for I don’t want to fight with the
negroes.”74 Many of them, however, cited Lee’s influence when describing their
opinions. Charles Baughman wrote simply, “Give Lee negro soldiers if he
wants.”75 A fellow Virginian noted, “I believe there will be a majority for putting
them in as soldiers. Gen. Lee is in favor of it I shall cast my vote for it. I am in .
favor of giving him anything he wants in the way of gaining our independence.”76
During the final weeks of the war, most soldiers - one man estimated “nine
tenths of the army” - came to agree with opinions such as these.77 While many
in the Army of Northern Virginia were pragmatic enough to understand the need
for black soldiers, especially as desertion increased, it still remained a delicate
issue in all corners of the Confederacy. Given the significance and timing of the
decision, “Marse Robert's” influence over the opinion of his own men on the
issue of African-American soldiers is undeniable.
Although many of Lee’s troops eventually came to support the arming of
slaves to fight for the Confederacy, the war itself forced all soldiers to confront
important racial issues and cultural values. One such soldier in the Army of
Northern Virginia predicted that there would be “an awful shaking of the nation”
74 Jeff Toalson, No Soap, No Pay, Diarrhea, Dysentery & Desertion: A Composite Diary of the
Last 16 Months of the Confederacy from 1864 to 1865 (Lincoln: illniverse, 2006), 346.
75 Charles Baughman to his wife, 19 January 1865, MOC.
76 Silas Chandler to his wife, 21 February 1865, Chandler Papers, LOV.
77 Power, L ee’s Miserables, 253.

30

when black bondage disappeared.78 Confederate troops at Petersburg reveal a
fragile period of transition caused by the destruction of slavery during the war.
One significant example occurred in front of Petersburg after the Battle of the
Crater on July 30, 1864, a battle in which a black Union division made one of the
failed attacks against the remnants of a blown up Confederate trench. Showing
what the war had become along with what the future might hold, Anthony Sydnor
Barksdale wrote home to family in Louisiana that “the slorter of negroes was
awful.. .It gows mighty against our boys to take negro prisoners. They would
never do it, if General Lee had not ordered it to be done.”79 African-Americans
fighting at Petersburg served to intensify the conflict in the minds of the
Confederates, and it may have provided the motivation necessary to remain in
the army during the final months of the war.
Other episodes of this nature occurred between Lee’s men and black
soldiers during their interaction as pickets. While white soldiers from both armies
tended to minimize the violence on the picket line whenever possible,
Confederates deliberately escalated the violence when entrenched across from
colored units. Alabamian Samuel Pickens recorded in his diary that “the Yankee
lines are [two miles] distant along here. There has been no picket-firing except
when the Yanks put negro pickets on & then our boys opened on them and kept
it up till they were taken away the next day.”80 During one period of the battle,
Union General Ambrose Burnside’s IX corps experienced “vicious” fighting on a
78 Chandra Manning, What this Cruel War was over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War (New
York: Vintage, 2008), 172.
79 Anthony Sydnor Barksdale to his sister Omis, August 1,1864, MOC, spelling as in original.
80 G. Ward Hobbs, Voices from Company D: Diaries by the Greensboro Guards, Fifth Alabama
Infantry Regiment, Army of Northern Virginia (Athens: University of Georgia, 2003), 341.
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daily basis after Confederate soldiers learned that the corps contained a division
of African-American soldiers.81 Slaveholding soldiers may have had the
strongest motive to fight and preserve an institution that had made many of them
wealthy, but Confederates who did not own slaves still felt the need to defend
racist values by escalating the level of violence at Petersburg. Confederate
General James Longstreet, as noted earlier, placed his weakest units across
from black Federal soldiers to persuade his men to stay in the trenches. For
reasons such as these, had it not been for their own manpower deficit,
Longstreet, Lee and other Confederate leaders might have viewed the presence
of African-Americans in the Union army as an ironic contributor to soldierly
motivation and discipline.
The South’s history of slavery affected the actions of Confederate soldiers
in the trenches also by providing a powerful image of what submission to another
looked like. That consciousness motivated many to continue fighting. Sergeant
Andrew Sydnor Barksdale believed that, even if “The North tells us if we come
back in the Union every state should have its rights,” he would still not approve of
peace because “[the North] would then commence their deep scheming to get us
bound both hand and foot.” His rhetoric related surrender to enslavement, and
he ended the letter with even stronger words: “So now boys of the South take
fresh courage and let’s fight to the last for Dixie.”82 One North Carolinian writing
to his brother warned of what he saw as the most dishonorable of consequences
when he wrote that a Union victory would “set [the black man] free, put him on

81 Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox, 597.
82 Andrew Sydnor Barskdale to unknown, August 1864, MOC.
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equality with you, [allow him to] eat with your Daughter at Church or elsewhere if
she resists it or insults the Black Scoundrel she is arrested...and taken to
prisen.”83 Using vivid language to describe their worst fears, these men fought
under the suspicion that military surrender would also result in the surrender of
their cherished status as free men.
Terms such as “subjugation” or “submission” came to describe the
consequences of peace without honor. Charles Baughman, writing home about
his desire for an “honorable peace,” represented this feeling. “On the peace
question,” he wrote, “it is true that some of the men are discouraged and ready to
_ give up, but that feeling is not as widely spread as some persons say. The great
, majority of us are determined never to submit.”84 At nearly the same time, Silas
Chandler also wrote from the trenches that “I look upon subjugation as being the
next thing to death.”85 In a letter designed to cheer up his “despondent” wife,
. D.C. Snyder warned that, “If the cause of the South is lost, all freedom of thought
and speech is lost and we go back into the old monarchical forms of
government.”86 Soldiers at Petersburg continually linked defeat with subjugation
or even enslavement to the conquering Federal armies. These worries,
especially among soldiers who stayed to fight at Petersburg, stemmed from a
fear of dishonor - a realistic threat to white men who grew up in a slave society in
which males of a different skin color did not own property, could not care for their
families, and thus lacked the entwined virtues of independence and manhood.
83 Manning, What this Cruel War was Over, 169.
84 Charles Baughman to his father, 6 February 1865, MOC.
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As the war progressed, events seemingly reinforced these suspicions held
by Confederate soldiers at Petersburg and served to create a caricature of the
Northern soldier as a dishonorable plunderer. After hearing news that the Union
army was once again in his hometown of Fredericksburg, Virginia, cavalryman
Marshall Decker became especially worried about his wife. “I fear you have been
stripped of the little you had. I think it is perfectly unnecessary to destroy the
property of noncombatants and far worse to take from the mouths of the old and
helpless.”87 In a similar letter eight days later, he described the Yankees’
“wanton destruction” as “barbarous,” added that “God will reward them their just
deserts” for their “black deeds of plunder,” and cautioned his wife to “keep out of
their sights. Don’t expose yourself to the gaze of such a rabble.”88 After hearing
stories about the consequences of defeat in other parts of the South, many
Confederate soldiers saw no other way to avoid such a fate than continued
military resistance, if for nothing else than as a method of revenge.
Even as soldiers deserted during Sherman’s March or while Sheridan’s
army destroyed crops in the Shenandoah Valley, others decided that the Army of
Northern Virginia was the only organization left that could defend against Union
“barbarity.” In doing so, they attached personal honor to military duty. After
learning about Union cavalry movements in the Shenandoah Valley, Captain
James Whitehorne asked his sister, “did the Yankees during the dusk raid get to
our house? Write to me at once and let me know if they got there.”89 Robert
Pooler Myers, a surgeon from Georgia, recorded in his diary during October,
87 Marshall Elton Decker to his wife Alphia Ellen, 2 June 1864, Decker Papers, LOV.
88 Ibid., 10 June 1864.
89 James Whitehorne to his sister, 8 July 1864, Whitehorne Family Papers, LOV.
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1864, that the enemy had “destroyed everything in their way - burning Mills,
barns, fences and also all the private property they could put their hands on even to wearing apparel of women and children,” a dishonorable trait if there ever
was one.90 By the time of the Siege of Petersburg, the war’s carnage was
expanding to directly affect a greater number of communities in the South, and
one important element of southern honor, writes Wyatt-Brown was “honor as
immortalizing valor, particularly in the character of revenge against familial and
community enemies.”91 As fears became reality for soldiers at Petersburg - after
countless stories of the sufferings of helpless women, children, and elderly
reached the trenches - many of them chose what they viewed as the honorable
path and stayed in the army to defend the white South against the specter of
debasement and tyranny. With each new Union military success, honor’s
demand that individual soldiers continue risking their lives, grew even stronger
for many.
Describing this phenomenon as the “powerful inertia generated by the
war,” Aaron Sheehan-Dean explains that “Union depredations exacerbated
already deep-seated antipathies toward the North that formed a component of
[white Southerners’] attachment to the Confederacy.”92 The communication
between civilians and soldiers during this stage of the war became particularly
important as rumors could provoke a variety of emotions and actions. Writing to
his son, a private at Petersburg in February 1865, Davis M. Wood averred that
he did not believe in “Yankee sincerity.” He also urged his son to “endure
90 Personal diary of Robert Pooler Myers, 16th Georgia Infantry, MOC.
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bravely” and avoid the “trashy” northern newspapers because “they are corrupt in
style and unfit for a Southern Man to read.”93 Andrew R. Barber wrote home to
his cousin in Dublin, Virginia: “I have just read a letter from Bro. Gabl. & Daughter
Mollie giving account of depredations &c of the Yankees. They now know & feel
what I knew & was made to feel nearly four years ago - only they have never
been made to suffer from the vandals as I have suffered.”94 Barber, a dedicated
secessionist from the beginning, described the growing contempt for Federal
forces as the war escalated to directly affect a greater number of civilians. One
wife wrote to her husband about General Sheridan’s scorched earth policy in the
Shenandoah Valley that the “Yankees behaved very shamefully to Mrs. Sturman
- took every eatable out of her house - meat, lard, and everything - More rapes
committed on [the] nicest ladies.”95
Because soldiers concerned themselves with the welfare of local
communities, the white women of the South had as powerful an influence on the
final fate of Lee’s army as the individual soldiers themselves did. The first priority
of every soldier who had loved ones at home was to ensure their safety. In an
undated letter written from Petersburg to his wife Ella, A.E. Decker concluded: “I
am dependent on thee therefore I hope and pray you will take special care of
yourself.”96 Worried that he might never see her again, William H. Bowling wrote
to his wife two weeks before the Confederate evacuation of Petersburg that he
would be sending her a ring to keep any future suitors away from her should he
93 Toalson, No Soap, No Pay, Diarrhea, Dysentery & Desertion, 325.
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never return home, because he expected that boys would “be flying a Round”
her.97 As rumors rose about the potential evacuation of the Confederate capital,
Charles Baughman became concerned about whether his family would leave the
city, “[If you have to evacuate], do you think it would be admirable for you, mom,
and [his sister] Minnie to stay in Richmond?”98 Amid crisis and uncertainty,
Confederate soldiers at Petersburg revealed apprehension not only about their
own welfare, but especially the fate of Confederate women.
Relations with civilians at home became important for preserving not only
individual honor, but the family’s reputation as well. During the winter of 1865,
for example, Silas Chandler wrote to his wife to express his worries about the
future of his family: “If I were to desert it would be a disgrace on me and my
children forever.”99 In their letters, some of these men displayed concerns about
the participation of other family members in the war. In a November message to
his sister, Fred Brode wrote that a boy in the family named Lucius should sign up
to join the army now that he was older. He even stated that “anyone under the
age of conscription and coming from enemy lines [such as parts of Louisiana]
has the privilege of joining [any regiment] he chooses.”100 Brode was interested
not only in further recruitment but also in preserving the honor of a younger
family member. Similarly, Baughman helpfully responded to his father’s
disappointment that he was too old to join by telling him that he should not feel
ashamed about claiming exemption, as “his health would not have lasted long in

97 William H. Bowling to his wife, 19 March 1865, William H. Bowling Letter, LOV.
98 Charles Baughman to his father, 25 January 1865, MOC.
99 Silas Chandler to his wife, 25 January 1865, LOV.
100 Fred A. Brode to his sister, 5 Nov 1864, MOC.
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the trenches.”101 Here, Baughman acknowledged that his father was not acting
with dishonor by not serving in the military.
In these instances, letters from Petersburg to families show a strong and
supportive connection between soldiers on the front lines and civilians at home.
In different instances, and especially during the war’s final months, other soldiers
began to feel powerfully disconnected from civilian society. Many letters written
from the trenches at Petersburg exhibit a strong discontentment, bordering on
hatred, regarding the population at home. Nathaniel Watkins wrote to his wife
that the South should send all able-bodied men to Petersburg at once because
there were “Thousands at home now.” He continued with harsh words about the
South as a whole: “I wish every man, woman, and child in the South would forget
how to pronounce the word [peace]...time for people to suffer a few hardships
the army has been bearing for years.”102
Just as women who remained loyal to the Confederacy helped motivate
soldiers to stay in the trenches, supposedly disloyal women caused the soldiers
who stayed at Petersburg much anxiety. J.F.J. Caldwell noted at the beginning
of 1865 that “the very women began to fail us,” explaining that the “bloodshed
had sickened them; their losses and their wants had become irritating to them.
They began to complain, they lost heart, and, as a class they finally sat down and
left us to ourselves.”103 In the same letter in which Baughman eased his father’s
concerns about honor, he also ascribed dishonor to sister: “I suspect she is
becoming like the rest of the girls, all of whom seem to prefer cowards to brave
101 Charles Baughman to his father, 14 October 1864, MOC.
102 Nathaniel V. Watkins to his wife, 19 January 1865, SWEM.
103 Caldwell, The History of a Brigade of South Carolinians, 250.
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men.”104 Support from home naturally decreased after military failures at
Petersburg and elsewhere, and the letters of loyal men in the trenches portray a
divided white population in the South that had a negative influence on the army’s
morale. Many of those who stayed relied upon soldierly devotion to best defend
their honor and were unforgiving when they believed the civilian population failed
to appreciate their sacrifices.
In his book about Civil War society, Embattled Courage, Gerald F.
Linderman writes about the contrast between civilian understandings of the war
and the reality of the conflict for soldiers, especially during 1864 and 1865.
Generally speaking, according to Linderman, there are “two wars:” one
experienced by civilians and the other by combatants. Secondly, as the war
progresses, these different experiences by different groups in society can
eventually “jeopardize soldier morale...and the cohesiveness of the nation’s
military forces.”105 While such a gulf in experience may have been more
profound in the Union, whose states remained mostly untouched by large-scale
military confrontations, the Confederate army still experienced difficulties of this
nature. One letter written from the trenches at Petersburg in January 1865
mentioned Confederate soldiers rejoicing about the news of Union victories. The
same letter also targets other white Southerners, perhaps of a more privileged
class, by claiming that “Only fat cats want war to [the] bitter end.”106 Whatever
forces motivated this man and his comrades to continue to do their duty in the

104 Charles Baughman to his father, 6 February 1865, MOC.
105 Linderman, Embattled Courage, 1.
106 EBS to his wife (no further identification of either), 17 January 1865, University of Duke,
Durham, NC.
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Confederate army despite their bitterness, his letter to his wife indicates a divide
within the Confederacy at the end of the war that undoubtedly affected the
soldiers in the trenches. Even among Confederates who remained within the
Army of Northern Virginia late in the war there were some who seemed
paradoxically to openly reject the idea of “fighting to the last for Dixie.”
At least as important, however, were the soldiers who banded together to
defend the Confederacy while civilian support fell. Unlike the soldiers who grew
despondent at Petersburg, som soldiers, according to Sheehan-Dean, felt
motivated by the differences between soldiers and civilians. “One of the many
paradoxes of the war in Virginia, was that the sense of persecution, almost living
martyrdom, that many Confederate soldiers felt by 1864 imbued them with new
resolve even as it isolated them from the people whom they fought to protect.”107
Not only did soldiers defending Petersburg worry about the welfare of themselves
and of loved ones back home; the conflict of opinion over the war effort also
complicated decisions about whether to stay or to attempt desertion. For many
of these soldiers, the growing diversity of opinion throughout the South provided
an opportunity to declare their loyalty to the Confederacy during its weakest hour.
Beginning in January 1865, Confederate units began coming together in
order to sign resolutions in which they declared their loyalty and willingness to
continue fighting the war. Many of these declarations were published in
newspapers in order to inspire civilians to continue supporting the army and its
efforts to fight the Union forces. Published on January 28, the 1st Virginia
Cavalry addressed their “friends at home” and their “comrades in arms,” stating
107 Sheehan-Dean, Why Confederates Fought, 157.
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that “it would rather become us, if we are free, to prepare vigorously for another
year of war” and that “such a course alone will lead to a speedy, lasting, and
honorable peace.”108 A particularly powerful resolution by the Palmetto Battery
from South Carolina read:
We desire peace on no other terms than our recognition as an
independent nation; that we will endure all hardships, dangers and
suffering; and rather than submit to be the slaves of a Northern
despot, we will fall with our backs to the field and our faces to the
foe like ‘Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans, who are still free
in their proud charnel at Thermopylae.’109
J.F.J. Caldwell summarized his brigade’s February statement by recalling:
We had determined to carry on the contest as long as it should be
at all possible, and we desired General Lee, the Congress, and the
people of the South to know it; and therefore we did not hesitate to
publish resolutions of as warlike a tone as the most ultra
secessionist could demand. But we were obliged to feel that the
nation was on the point of submission, which required to be
sustained in its position by a half-famished, half-naked army of fifty
thousand men.
Upon adoption of this resolution, General McGowan, the brigade commander,
visited his soldiers to give them a rousing speech that also served, according to
Caldwell, to “animate” the troops.110 The resolutions did not put an end to
desertion in the ranks. Flowever, stemming from the ranks of soldiers
themselves, they represent many soldiers’ continued commitment to the cause
as well as their desire to rally civilian support by publicly declaring the noble
intention of self-defense.
Passing these resolutions also made the decision to stay and fight an
easier one for men who could not know the true intentions of their fellow soldiers,
108 “Spirit of the Army,” Richmond Enquirer, 28 January 1865.
109 Ibid., 18 February 1865.
110 Caldwell, The History of a Brigade of South Carolinians, 262.
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or as one man explained to his wife, “I can’t see what the men are thinking
about.”111 Wyatt-Brown writes that oath-taking was relied upon as a “bond in lieu
of family obligations and allegiances.”112 When the army’s many individual units
adopted resolutions during the final months of the war at Petersburg, they added
the tradition of oath-taking to build camaraderie and keep the army together. No
Confederate soldier who stayed to fight at Petersburg wanted to have the
experience undergone by William Myers from North Carolina when he woke up in
January 1865 “very much surprised” to find that all of his friends had deserted in
the middle of the night.113 The 1865 resolutions helped soldiers communicate
with the civilian population, but also served to mitigate the mistrust among
soldiers forced to question one another’s willingness to continue fighting for an
honorable peace.
Many in Lee’s army at Petersburg spoke often of their desire for an
“honorable peace.” They may not have been able to define the term, but their
words and actions hint that honor was far more important than peace. From the
trenches of Petersburg in January 1865, one such Confederate expressed inner
conflict about the end of the war. He clearly desired an “honorable peace or
none,” but also wrote about having heard that “[the North] will acknowledge our
independence and [we will] form an alliance with them to uphold the Monroe
Doctrine. That is, help them drive the French out of Mexico and the British out of
Canada.”114 This hopeful story shows that Confederate soldiers might stay on

111 Silas Chandler to his wife, 21 February 1865, LOV.
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the front for honor's sake even as they could be as desperate for peace as any
other rational American by that point in the war. It is an important opinion
because it represents the confusion of those who stayed as they tried to
reconcile their need to defend honor with their desire for peace.
The aspiration for an honorable peace also became the foundation for the
events at Appomattox Courthouse. Of those Confederates who decided to stay
at the Siege of Petersburg, many eventually had no choice but to evacuate the
defenses when Union forces broke through Confederate lines southwest of
Petersburg on April 2, 1865. On that day, Lee made the decision to give up the
Confederate capital along with Petersburg in an attempt to join with the remnants
of Johnston’s army to the South. A week later, however, Lee found his army cut
off almost devoid of supplies at Appomattox Courthouse.

Lee finally

surrendered. At such points in history, times when war and peace blend
together, events become largely unpredictable. Luckily for the country as a
whole, the two armies that gathered for the famous surrender at Appomattox
Courthouse understood one another well enough to make a successful transition
out of war. The events following the surrender of Lee’s army in April 1865 reveal
the main concerns that had characterized Confederate soldiers at Petersburg
throughout the siege.
First of all, many who remained in the Army of Northern Virginia at the end
of the war were motivated to continue resisting if necessary. Robert Stiles
recounted the army’s escape from Petersburg as a relief, conveying yet another
rumor about the Confederate army drawing the enemy into a trap away from the
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trenches. He compared his situation to a story of a child attempting to build up
the courage to jump from an elevated bluff and the advice he gave the
adolescent, “Don’t you see - the jumping-off place is not the end of all things?
Never say die! If you must leave your present position and jump off, do it like a
man and make the best of it. The end is not yet.”115 While Stiles likely
exaggerated his feelings while writing his memoir years later, it is still interesting
that he remembered about the escape from Petersburg his determination to fight
on “like a man.” Willing to risk everything to secure honor, soldiers carried on
their military duty when the potential consequences of surrender seemed worse
than death. Given the motivation of many in Lee’s army to continue against
overwhelming odds, how did the end occur in such an abrupt and peaceful
manner?
One sure answer is starvation. Many of Lee’s men could not physically
escape surrender or continue to battle the Union army. A more fulfilling
explanation of why soldiers present at Appomattox went home quietly, even after
being fed, concerns the understanding the two armies had of one another. The
soldiers certainly came to dislike one another during the final, violent year of the
war in Virginia, but Lincoln, Grant and the Army of the Potomac understood that
the Confederate soldiers who remained desired an honorable peace or “none at
all.” The peace process went smoothly, then, partly because Grant allowed the
Southerners finally to separate individual honor from military duty. Contrary to
their worst fears, Confederate soldiers were not forced into servitude and were
not required to give up their land to a conquering army. During the surrender at
115 Stiles, Four Years under Marse Robert, 317-319.
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Appomattox Courthouse, the fears that had motivated Confederate soldiers to
reluctantly continue fighting quietly vanished. Instead, soldiers peacefully went
home as free men, guilty of no crime, and free to raise and provide for their
families once again. Many of them even managed to come away with horses
and mules, a necessity to rebuild farms that had been ruined by war.
More than to anyone else, however, it was left to General Lee to persuade
his men of the merits of their terms for surrender. He understood that he had
loyal followers who needed assurance that they had maintained honor - that they
could walk home after a military defeat without shame. In his famous farewell
address to the Army of Northern Virginia on April 10, 1865, General Lee touched
the heart of the issue by writing,
After four years of arduous service marked by unsurpassed
courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been
compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources. I need
not tell the survivors of so many hard fought battles who have
remained steadfast to the last that I have consented to this result
from no distrust of them. You will take with you the satisfaction that
proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed....116
Lee understood that honor had motivated his men to fight during the gloomiest
days at Petersburg. His farewell address not only allows one to better understand
the Army of Northern Virginia at the time of its defeat; the message also attests
to the important role that notions of honor had played during the war and would
continue to play in the years thereafter.
Especially during the desperate weeks at Petersburg, Lee could always
sympathize with his men on the issue of honor and reputation. During the final

116 Robert E. Lee, Farewell Address to the Army of Northern Virginia, 10 April 1865, Appomattox
Courthouse, VA.
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day of fighting around Petersburg on April 2, 1865, Robert E. Lee provided rare
insight into his own conflicted thoughts after the death of Lt. General A.P. Hill.
When Hill failed to rally his men and delay the successful Union assault, he was
shot through the heart and killed instantly. After survivors reported the death to
Lee, he replied solemnly, “He is at rest now, and we who are left are the ones to
suffer.”117 Lee, whose decision whether or not to continue fighting carried the
most inftuence on the future of the country, expressed the conflicted state of
mind felt by all individual Confederate soldiers who were suffering in a state of
uncertainty at Petersburg. They wanted to escape the privations and violence of
war, but they also could not risk the dishonor of submission. Lee’s surrender
came later than it needed to, but it also secured both peace and honor for 28,000
Confederate soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia.
However, the war did not end on April 9, and there remained tens of
thousands of Confederate soldiers still unwilling to submit to the Union armies,
including soldiers who had decided to stay and fight at Petersburg. Alabamian
Samuel Pickens was one of the thousands of Southerners captured by Union
forces a week earlier on April 2, 1865, who refused to take the oath of loyalty to
the Union. Instead of going home to friends and family in Alabama, Pickens
believed his honor continued to be at risk, so he lived in a prisoner of war camp
for an entire month before Federal officials could convince him to take the oath
and accept release. To him and the many other Confederate soldiers who
resisted even after the bitter end, “yankee” victory still threatened dishonorable
results.
117 Greene, Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion, 350.
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Upon hearing the news that Lee’s army had finally surrendered, Pickens
titled his diary entry from prison on April 10, 1865 “Horror of horrors.”118 A month
later, he continued to be suspicious about taking the oath of loyalty and wrote in
his diary from prison worried that the Federal government would “publish to the
world that [former Confederates] took the [loyalty] oath voluntarily” and that they
would use this to prove that “the poor deluded, ignorant creatures were duped,
misguided and forced into this war.”119 History teaches that soldiers had little to
fear once they finally surrendered to Grant’s army, yet this fact was not obvious
to the many soldiers who risked their lives to avoid taking an oath of loyalty to the
United States. Many of them equated surrender with dishonor and remained
stubbornly opposed to taking an oath that by some standards would have sent
them home with more honor than they could have hoped for while entrenched at
Petersburg.

118 Hobbs, Voices from Company D, 370.
119 Ibid., 377.
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Conclusion
Published histories by white Southerners during the months and years
following the war often focused on the soldiers who followed Lee obediently
during the Siege of Petersburg, rather than upon topics of treason or slavery. In
later years, veterans re-attached personal honor to military duty by glorifying
Lee’s soldiers as a unified group with a virtuous cause. Jubal Early, a
commander of soldiers who never gave in to Union pressures until the final
surrender, contributed to this legacy of the Army of Northern Virginia when he
gave a speech honoring General Lee in 1872. In the speech he stated his
memory of the surrender: “The remnant of the Army of Northern Virginia fell
back, more than one-hundred miles, before its overpowering antagonist. Finally
from mere exhaustion, less than 8,000 men with arms in their hands, of the
noblest army that ever fought in the tide of time were surrendered at Appomattox
to an army of 150,000 men.”120 In offering such a dramatized view of the
moment, Early’s speech emphasized the honorable characteristics of military
valor and undaunted courage - a legacy that would be embraced by as well as
attached to the soldiers who fought under Lee at Petersburg. In reality, the Army
of Northern Virginia continued to fight at Petersburg in 1865 because men with
conflicted hearts and minds were understandingly confused about what kind of
future peace would bring to their families and communities. Notions of honor had
only served to intensify the confusion at Petersburg.

120 Jubal Early, in Recollections and Letters of General Lee by Robert E. Lee, Jr. (New York:
Doubleday, Page, & Co., 1904), 148.
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Today, 150 years removed from a terrible Civil War, it is interesting to ask
how and why Americans remember the war. How is it that a country so divided
in a war that cost the United States roughly two percent of its population can
continue to honor men who chose to secede from and fight against their country?
To answer this question, one cannot ignore the final months of the Siege at
Petersburg that led to the surrender at Appomattox. The Confederate soldiers
who stayed to fight at Petersburg exemplify the types of questions Americans
must confront when attempting to understand the Civil War. In one sense, these
soldiers prolonged a war in defense of an immoral cause. From another
perspective, they overcame unimaginable hardships to do their duty and defend
their honor. J. Tracy Power concludes his book by stating that “those who
persevered from the Wilderness to Appomattox... set a standard that is a fitting
testament to the resiliency of the human spirit, that quality that above all others
made the Army of Northern Virginia such a cohesive community of men and such
a formidable body of soldiers.”121
The Siege of Petersburg solidified this legacy of the Confederate soldiers
in the Army of Northern Virginia. Yet, it is also important to remember the divides
within the army and the Confederacy as a whole, which caused everything from
desertion to persistence, from pessimism to unfailing confidence. Leaders of
both North and South understood that many of the Confederate soldiers left
standing at the end continued to fight from the trenches, because it was their last
hope for honor in a world full of unimaginable unknowns. To understand the end
of the war, it is necessary to study the men who never deserted at Petersburg.
121 Power, Lee’s Miserables, 321.
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Similarly, to understand how Americans remember the Civil War today, one
cannot overlook Lee’s band of followers and the prestige they won during peace.
For better and worse, those who stood fast in defense of Petersburg managed to
achieve the peace with honor that they had fought for.
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